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Background: The existence of quasi-formal and informal payments in the Ukrainian health care system jeopardizes
equity and creates barriers to access to proper care. Patient payment policies that better match patient preferences
are necessary. We analyze the potential and feasibility of official patient charges for public health care services in
Ukraine by studying the patterns of fee acceptability, ability and willingness to pay (WTP) for public health care
among population groups.
Methods: We use contingent valuation data collected from 303 respondents representative of the adult Ukrainian
population. Three decision points were separated: objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive non-zero
WTP. These decisions were studied for relations with quality profiles of the services, and socio-demographic
characteristics of the respondents and their households.
Results: The likelihood to object to pay is mostly determined by the quality characteristics of the services.
Objection to pay is not related to corresponding behavior in real life. The likelihood of being unable to pay is
associated with older age, lower income, and a larger share of household members with no income. The level of
positive WTP is positively related to income (+7% per 1000 UAH increase in income) and is lower for people who
visited a doctor but did not pay (−22%).
Conclusions: Rather substantial WTP levels (between 0.9% and 1.9% of household income) for one visit to
physician indicate a potential for official patient charges in Ukraine. User fees may cover a substantial share of
personnel cost in the out-patient sector. The patterns of inability to pay support well designed exemption criteria
based on age, income, and other aspects of economic status. The WTP patterns highlight the necessity for
payments that are proportional to income. Other methodological and policy implications are discussed.
Keywords: Willingness to pay, Demand, Contingent valuation, Physician services, Ability to pay, Payment
acceptanceBackground
The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees free of charge
provision of medical aid in public facilities for every citi-
zen [1]. Thus, it practically bans all patient charges in
the public sector. However, there is a mismatch between
regulation and reality. This is caused by the quasi-formal
charges (providers’ requests to pay official charitable* Correspondence: danyliv@gmail.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orcontributions to the health care organization which
should be voluntary in nature). There are also informal
(under-the-table) charges in the form of cash or in-kind
gifts paid to health care providers for better services.
Such unregulated charges have distortive effects on
healthcare provision and consumption [2-4]. Most im-
portant, they jeopardize equity in health care and create
barriers to access even in the absence of official patient
charges.
This ‘status quo’ inherited from the Semashko system
established in Ukraine during the Soviet Union period,
seems to currently satisfy only policy-makers who, asLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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abroad or in the best public facilities [5]. The political
establishment guards zealously the tax-funded free-of
-charge principle of public health care provision for the
sake of retaining electoral support. However, this policy
conservatism is at odds with the inefficiency of resource
allocation and the high level of patient dissatisfaction
with the healthcare system [6]. Ukrainian patients suffer
from a lack of access to proper care (especially in rural
areas) [7], long waiting lines, the reluctance of unmoti-
vated medical staff to offer adequate care [2], and obso-
lete and inefficient treatment methods [8]. They are left
with the option to seek better access and quality by
means of quasi-formal and informal payments, unless
they can use their personal connections to obtain the
services they desire [2,9].
The data suggest that patients in Ukraine cover a sub-
stantial part of health care expenditure out of pocket.
WHO data indicate that private out-of-pocket expend-
iture in Ukraine amounts to around 40.5% of total health
expenditures [10] with a very small part being adminis-
tered in the private sector [3] although the exact size of
out-of-pocket payments in the private sector is un-
known. This is one of the largest shares of out-of-pocket
payments in Europe which contradicts the official ‘free-
of-charge’ policy in Ukraine.
Most of the out-of-pocket spending is for medical
goods. These should be provided to patients for free by
the public health care settings, but patients have to pur-
chase them outside the setting due to the absence of
these medical goods in these facilities (see data at [10]).
In addition to this, evidence suggests that the share of
unofficial patient charges (i.e. quasi-formal and informal
charges) at public health care settings is substantial
[9,11,12]. Unregulated patient charges create a consider-
able financial burden on households and provoke re-
duced and unequal access to public health care services
in Ukraine [2]. This problem is recognized at the na-
tional level (e.g. [7,8]). In view of this, it is not surprising
that about 50% of the Ukrainian patients state that they
either have to borrow money to pay for health care or to
forgo services due to patient charges [9].
Obviously, there is a need for a more efficient patient
payment policy. Together with other anticorruption
measures, official patient charges may to a certain extent
reduce the need to pay unofficial charges. They may pro-
vide extra revenues for health care providers, reduce in-
efficient health care provision and excess demand for
health care [13]. However, the implementation of official
patient charges is not straightforward. Apart from the
need to establish a legal base for the implementation of
such charges, the exact patient payment mechanism
should be carefully designed and account for the popula-
tion’s needs and ability to pay.In this study, we analyze the potential and feasibility of
official patient charges for public health care services in
Ukraine. We address this issue by studying the patterns
of fee acceptability, ability and willingness to pay (WTP)
for public health care across population groups. The
analysis is based on contingent valuation data from a
household survey among a small representative sample
of the Ukrainian population. Contingent valuation
(CV) is a stated preference method that is widely ap-
plied in health services research to study individual
willingness to pay for a health care good (for a review
see e.g. [14-16]).
We focus on fees for physician services provided to
patients with major health problems. We relate accept-
ability, ability and willingness to pay stated by the re-
spondents to the specialization of the physician and to
the quality/access profile of the physician. This is rele-
vant for policy making because the role of primary care
is still neglected in Ukraine as primary care providers
are often bypassed by the patients and the number of
general practitioners (GPs) is still insufficient. At the
same time, the quality of and access to care is reported
to be unsatisfactory [6], which is frequently explained by
the severe under-financing of the system [17,18]. The
unregulated patient payments are known to fill this fi-
nancial gap. The question is whether Ukrainian patients
are willing and able to pay officially for quality and ac-
cess improvements. Our study can be a useful starting
point for policy discussions in Ukraine as well as in
other countries that face similar problems (especially
other former socialist countries).
Methods
Data were collected in a household survey among 303
respondents who agreed to participate in face-to-face in-
terviews conducted in December 2009. An informed
consent was obtained from all individuals included in
the study. The study instruments and methodology were
reviewed by the Institutional Review Board at the Na-
tional University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and a waiver
from a full ethical review was obtained. A stratified,
multi-stage area probability sampling strategy was ap-
plied with 110 settlements as primary units and 270
voting precincts as secondary units. The sample is repre-
sentative of the adult Ukrainian (aged 18 and older)
population. However, for logistic reasons, the data col-
lection was performed within a larger household survey.
Therefore, information about the non-response rate and,
consequently, non-respondents’ characteristics is not
available.
The questionnaire contained various parts, including
parts that focus on the past use of medical services, con-
sumer stated preferences, and household and personal
characteristics of respondents. We present the results of
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four CV tasks. Respondents were asked to state if they
would be willing to pay for a visit to a physician with
quality and access characteristics expressed by four
profiles. In case a respondent was willing to pay for a
given physician profile, a combination of payment
cards and open-ended questions was applied. First, the
respondent selected a payment interval from the card,
then, an exact amount within the interval (open-ended
question). Payment cards enabled framing respondents’
answers (preventing overstatement), while exact values
elicited by the open-ended questions served as a more
precise indication of the maximum WTP level. If a
respondent was not willing to pay, s/he was asked to
state the reason. The exact wording of the CV tasks is
presented in Additional file 1. The four valuation pro-
files were designed in a way to estimate two separate
effects on the WTP for physician services: (i) the effect
of a physician’s specialization (general practitioner or
medical specialist), and (ii) the effect of quality/access
improvements (namely the joint effect of improvements
in the state of medical equipment, maintenance of the
physician office, and the reduction in waiting time in
front of the physician’s office from 45 to 10 minutes).
The four valuation tasks and the effects on the WTP
studied are summarized in Table 1.
The socio-demographic and household characteristics
are summarized in Table 2. The sample does not differ
substantially from the entire Ukrainian population ex-
cept for a slight over-presentation of women and some
specific age groups. To account for this slight overrepre-
sentation, we include these and other socio-demographic
characteristics in the analysis.
We calculated the proportion of respondents who
were willing and unwilling to pay for physician services
(with a specified reason for their unwillingness to pay –
object to pay and/or inability to pay). We also estimated
the mean WTP amount. For the purpose of compari-
son, we looked at three measures of mean WTP: (i) in-
cluding all answers (both positive and zero WTP
answers), (ii) excluding protest answers (i.e. statementsTable 1 Physician profiles included in the CV tasks and the ef
Attributes * Physician profiles in
GP basic
profile
GP improved
profile
S
Physician’s specialization 0 = GP 0 = GP
State of the medical equipment 0 = Outdated 1 = Modern
Maintenance of the
physician’s office
0 = Old-looking 1 = Renovated 0
Waiting time in front of
the office
45 min 10 min
* Two attributes remained constant in all profiles: attitude of the medical staff = poof unwillingness to pay due to an objection to pay fees),
and (iii) including only positive WTP values. From a
methodology point of view, protest answers should be
excluded from the analysis since those who just object
to pay may not really place a zero value on the services
under valuation and would be willing to pay in a real
market [19]. It should be noted however that this issue
is still debated.
We use a three-phase modeling approach because the
WTP data were obtained using a sequence of three main
questions (see Figure 1): first whether the respondent is
WTP (positive or zero WTP), and second, given a posi-
tive WTP, what is the maximum WTP level, or given a
zero WTP, what is the reason for the unwillingness to
pay. Three main categories were used to structure the
reasons for the unwillingness to pay: objection to pay,
inability to pay or both. Hence, respondents who se-
lected the last category were assigned as being both un-
able and objecting to pay.
Thus, as presented in Figure 1, three decisions were
separated: objection to pay, inability to pay, and the level
of positive non-zero WTP. For the first model (objection
to pay), the cases (y=1) include those who stated that
they “object to pay”, “object to pay for this kind of ser-
vice”, or “both unable and object to pay”. They were
compared to those who do not object (y=0), i.e. stated a
zero WTP due to the inability to pay only, or a positive
WTP. The second model (inability to pay) included
those who stated that they either are “unable to pay” or
“both unable and object” as cases (y=1). They were com-
pared to those who are not unable to pay (y=0), i.e.
stated a zero WTP due to objection only or a positive
WTP. These two models have binary response variables;
hence, we use random effect logistic regression (consid-
ering that one respondent evaluates four profiles). De-
note the probability of a positive response (object to pay
in the first model or being unable to pay in the second)
for a respondent i valuing profile j as Pij,y=1. Then, the
log odds can be described as a linear combination of the
socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent and
characteristics of the physician profile under valuation:fects on WTP studied
cluded in the CV tasks Effects on WTP studied
pecialist basic
profile
Specialist improved
profile
1 = Specialist 1 = Specialist Specialization
0 = Outdated 1 = Modern Quality/access
improvements
= Old-looking 1 = Renovated
45 min 10 min
lite, and travel time to the physician’s office = 15 min.
Table 2 Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample (303 respondents)
Characteristic Observations Percentage of total Percent of non-missing Mean (S.D.)
Age
aged 18-34 72 23.76% 23.76% 47.5 (16.2)
aged 35-54 127 41.91% 41.91% valid n = 303
aged 55+ 104 34.32% 34.32%
Sex
male 98 32.34% 32.34%
female 205 67.66% 67.66%
Place of residence
village 122 40.26% 40.26%
town (20–100) or small city (100–500) 116 38.28% 38.28%
big city (500+) or capital 65 21.45% 21.45%
Education level
lower than secondary 61 20.13% 20.20%
secondary 174 57.43% 57.62%
higher or degree 67 22.11% 22.19%
(missing) 1 0.33%
Health status
absolutely sick to bad 49 16.17% 16.17%
fair 139 45.87% 45.87%
good to perfect 115 37.95% 37.95%
Voluntary insurance policy
no 287 94.72% 95.35%
yes 14 4.62% 4.65%
(missing) 2 0.66%
Size of the household
1 member 41 13.53% 13.53% 3.03 (1.56)
2 or more members 262 86.47% 86.47% valid n = 303
Number of children in the household
no children 181 59.74% 60.33% 0.55 (0.84)
1 or more children 119 39.27% 39.67% valid n = 300
(missing) 3 0.99%
Share of household members who do not work or earn
less or one half of family not working 166 54.79% 54.97% 0.53 (0.35)
more than half of family not 136 44.88% 45.03% valid n = 302
(missing) 1 0.33%
Income (descriptive)
not sufficient 105 34.65% 35.71%
meets the need 126 41.58% 42.86%
allows saving 63 20.79% 21.43%
(missing) 9 2.97%
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Table 2 Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample (303 respondents) (Continued)
Income (level, UAH)
1000 UAH or less 58 19.14% 21.72% 2 346.8 (1 781.1)
from 1001 to 2000 UAH 104 34.32% 38.95% valid n = 267
from 2001 to 4000 UAH 66 21.78% 24.72%
4001 UAH and more 39 12.87% 14.61%
(missing) 36 11.88%
Experience in visiting and paying to a physician
did not visit 55 18.15% 18.97%
visited did not pay 101 33.33% 34.83%
visited and paid 134 44.22% 46.21%
(missing) 13 4.29%
Total 303 100% 100%
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Pij;y¼1
Pij;y¼0
 
¼ log Pij;y¼1
1−Pij;y¼1
 
¼ βXXj þ βSDC⋅SDCi þ β0 þ εij
þ νi; ð1Þ
where Xj is a set of profile j specific characteristics, SDCi
are socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent
i, εij is a stochastic error term and νi is a respondent spe-
cific random element. In this specification exponential
coefficients represent the odds ratios for the change in
characteristics.
exp βx∂x
  ¼ pðY jx  þ∂xÞ=ð1−pðY jx  þ∂xÞÞ
p Y xÞ= 1−p Y xÞÞjððjð ð2Þ
The third model (level of WTP) included only positive
WTP levels. However, the positive WTP distribution
was found to be skewed compared to the normal distri-
bution. Therefore, in the analysis, we use a logarithmic
transformation of positive WTP, which better resembled
a normal distribution. The logarithm of respondent’s
i WTP for a visit to a physician with profile j can beFigure 1 Decision sequence in the CV tasks and resulting modeling pspecified as random effect linear regression (also consid-
ering that one respondent evaluated 4 profiles):
log WTPij
  ¼ βXXj þ βSDC⋅SDCi þ β0 þ εij
þ νi: ð3Þ
In this specification, coefficients represent percent changes
in WTP in response to a unit change in the characteristics:
βX;SDC ¼ ∂ log WTPijð Þ
.
∂X;SDC
¼ ∂WTPij WTPij⋅∂X;SDCð Þ ð4Þ
A set of socio-demographic characteristics (see Table 2)
was included in the three models, as well as an indicator
of the physician’s specialization and an indicator of ser-
vice improvement. The models were also checked for
the inclusion of interactions between service characteris-
tics and socio-demographic characteristics but this did
not add to the model fit (hence, it reduced the model
performance in terms of the Bayesian Information Cri-
terion and degrees of freedom). Therefore, interactions
were not included in the final models. The models wereoints.
Table 3 Mean WTP for physician services
Willingness to pay, UAH*
All answers
included
Objection
answers
excluded
Only positive
WTP included
Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N
GP basic
profile
9.36 (23.47) 302 20.79 (31.44) 136 37.21 (34.06) 76
GP improved
profile
32.59 (45.12) 297 37.37 (46.43) 259 44.81 (47.46) 216
Specialist
basic profile
8.91 (23.13) 300 22.10 (32.23) 121 38.20 (34.39) 70
Specialist
improved
profile
40.50 (48.92) 301 45.14 (49.58) 270 51.87 (49.75) 235
*Average daily exchange rate during the period of data collection is 11.5424
UAH / EUR.
Danyliv et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:208 Page 6 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/208reduced to only statistically significant variables in order
to see which factors had a stable effect. Both full and re-
duced versions are presented and discussed.
Results
As displayed in Figure 2, a substantial part of the sample is
willing to pay official fees for physician services. The share
of respondents willing to pay is considerably higher (about
three times higher) for physician profiles that indicate
quality/access improvements than for the corresponding
basic profiles. Specialization itself does not seem to have a
large effect on the proportions of those who are willing or
unwilling to pay. For profiles with less attractive quality/
access characteristics, the dominant reason for being un-
willing to pay is that people object to pay for such services.
In contrast, profiles with better quality/access characteris-
tics practically do not yield answers with such motivation
for the unwillingness to pay. Other reasons for unwilling-
ness to pay (i.e. cannot afford, object to pay for medical
services, and both) are stated relatively infrequently. How-
ever, 11–20% of the respondents say that they are unable
to pay (unable or both unable and object).
Table 3 presents the three estimates of the mean WTP
for physician services: (i) when all answers are considered
(both positive and zero WTP answers), (ii) when only non-
protest answers (excluding those who object to pay) are
considered, and (iii) when only positive WTP answers are
considered. Regardless of the type of estimate, the mean
WTP is significantly higher for both a GP and a medical
specialist with better characteristics than for physicians with
less attractive characteristics. Due to the large number of
protest zeros for the less attractive profiles, the differences
between the two mean estimates that include zero WTP
answers (with and without protest answers) is substantial:
9.36 versus 20.39 UAH per visit for a GP (around 0.81 Euro
and 1.80 Euro respectively), and 8.91 versus 22.10 UAH per
visit for a medical specialist (around 0.77 Euro and 1.91
Euro respectively). However, for the profiles with more at-
tractive characteristics the difference between these twoFigure 2 Proportion of respondents willing/unwilling to pay for physmeans is not so large (around 5 UAH for both
specialization modes). Specialization itself appears to have a
minor impact on mean WTP although in most cases, WTP
for a medical specialist is higher than that for GP services.
Table 4 presents the results of the three modeling pro-
cesses (as described in the previous section): objection
to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive WTP. Each
of the modeling stages contains two versions of the
model: a full model with all predictors, and a reduced
model with only significant predictors. Further, we only
discuss conclusions about predictors that are insensitive
to the specification of the model, i.e. significant in both
the full and reduced models.
Objection to pay for physician services is found to be
strongly related to the quality/access characteristics of the
profile. As can be seen from the significant negative coeffi-
cients, profiles with better quality/access characteristics
have lower odds (80–100 lower chances) to object to pay.
This is in line with the finding above that those who object
to pay for physician services with less attractive quality/ac-
cess characteristics constitute the larger share of the re-
spondents who are unwilling to pay. The indicators ofician services.
Table 4 Results of modeling WTP: objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive WTP
Dependent variable
Objection to pay Random effect
logit
Inability to pay Random effect
logit
WTP level Random effect
linear
1= object, unable and object 1= unable, unable and object LN (WTP Positive)
0= unable, WTP>0 0= object, WTP>0
Full model Reduced
model
Full model Reduced
model
Full model Reduced
model
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Specialization of a physician:
0 = GP 1 = Specialist
0.185 (0.212) −0.689* (0.301) −0.727* (0.286) 0.143* (0.034) 0.138* (0.033)
Quality/access characteristics:
0 = Basic characteristics
−4.411* (0.360) −4.681* (0.359) −1.210* (0.316) −1.120* (0.296) 0.366* (0.045) 0.362* (0.045)
1 = Improved characteristics
Age
aged 18-34 −0.086 (0.560) −0.584 (1.082) −0.319 (0.912) 0.132 (0.134)
aged 35-54 ref. ref. ref. ref.
aged 55+ −0.223 (0.591) 2.082* (1.032) 1.633* (0.731) −0.156 (0.143)
Sex
female ref. ref. ref.
male −0.506 (0.459) −1.060 (0.831) 0.051 (0.109)
Place of residence
village ref. ref. ref.
town (to 100)/small city (to 500) −0.894** (0.476) 0.165 (0.771) 0.068 (0.114)
big city (500+) and capital −0.528 (0.581) 1.406 (0.993) 0.001 (0.141)
Education level
primary or no education −0.281 (0.579) 0.354 (0.838) −0.089 (0.145) −0.198 (0.132)
secondary education ref. ref. ref. ref.
higher education or sc. degree −0.117 (0.537) 0.378 (0.928) 0.186 (0.126) 0.220** (0.118)
Health status
absolutely sick to bad 0.278 (0.643) 0.964 (0.897) 0.135 (0.157)
fair ref. ref. ref.
good to perfect 0.318 (0.532) −0.989 (0.927) −0.139 (0.128)
Voluntary insurance policy
no voluntary insurance ref. ref. ref. ref.
has voluntary health insurance −0.751 (0.975) −33.337 (>3x105) 0.535* (0.216) 0.448* (0.208)
Size of the house hold
1 member (alone) ref. ref. ref.
2+ members 0.663 (0.690) 0.193 (1.021) −0.147 (0.168)
Number of children in the household
No children in the household ref. ref. ref.
1+ children in the household 0.616 (0.491) 1.713** (0.956) −0.044 (0.116)
Share of household members who do not earn
<= half of household not working ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
> half of household not working −1.102* (0.488) −1.039* (0.425) 1.748* (0.800) 2.561* (0.685) −0.016 (0.115)
Income (descriptive)
not sufficient ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
meets the need −0.521 (0.493) −0.695 (0.468) −2.402* (0.827) −2.505* (0.697) 0.115 (0.123)
allows saving −0.979 (0.652) −1.633* (0.579) −4.925* (1.408) −5.334* (1.293) 0.059 (0.151)
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Table 4 Results of modeling WTP: objection to pay, inability to pay, and level of positive WTP (Continued)
Experience in visiting and paying
did not visit −0.263 (0.569) 0.684 (1.005) 0.393 (0.881) 0.032 (0.135) 0.009 (0.123)
visited did not pay −0.055 (0.472) 0.886 (0.752) 1.537* (0.701) −0.208** (0.114) −0.219* (0.110)
visited and paid ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Level of income, UAH 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 70.6*(32.2) x10-6 67.3*(26.2)x10-6
Constant term 2.405* (0.893) 2.545* (0.462) −3.931* (1.397) −4.331* (0.812) 3.001* (0.217) 2.945* (0.115)
Residuals' statistics
/lnsig2u 1.968 2.148 2.630 2.703 - -
sigma_u 2.675 2.927 3.725 3.863 0.649 0.644
sigma_e 0.364 0.361
rho 0.685 0.723 0.808 0.819 0.761 0.761
Model fit
Number of obs 989 1150 989 1133 499 513
Wald chi2 150.73 170.43 43.73 49 117.3 115.9
Ll −449.9 Ll −518.8 Ll −260.4 Ll −295.5 R2 w-in 0.229 R2 w-in 0.232
AIC 943.87 AIC 1049.7 AIC 564.8 AIC 612.9 btw 0.145 btw 0.119
BIC 1051.6 BIC 1080 BIC 672.5 BIC 668.3 ov-all 0.146 ov-all 0.123
Significance level: * p< 0.05; ** 0.05≤ p ≤0.10; ref. – reference group.
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of objecting to pay for physician services. Respondents liv-
ing in households where most members (or respondents
themselves) do not earn an income are less likely to object
to pay. On the other hand, a high perceived household in-
come (one that allows savings) might also reduce the in-
clination to object, though this effect is significant only in
the reduced version of the model. An unstable effect,
which disappears when the model is reduced to significant
factors only, is found for the place of residence with town
or small city residents being less likely to object. Other
socio-demographic factors demonstrate no effect on the
likelihood of objecting to pay.
Inability to pay is related not only to the profile char-
acteristics, but also to the specialization of a physician.
The effect of the quality/access improvements is smaller
compared to the model of objection to pay, but still
highly significant, with more attractive profiles having
3 – 3.3 times lower odds to yield an inability-to-pay
response. A similar effect is observed for the specialization
of the physician but with a slightly lower magnitude: a
medical specialist has a twice lower chance of yielding zero
WTP due to inability to pay. Akin to objection to pay,
inability to pay is significantly reduced by the increase
in the share of household members who earn an in-
come and by the perceived income. However, unlike the
objection to pay, respondents from households with
more nonearning members are more likely to report
that they are unable to pay. Perceived income is also a
very strong predictor of inability to pay irrespective of
the model specification, with higher income levels beingassociated with lower chances to report inability to pay.
It is also notable that people aged 55 or more are much
more likely to report being unable to pay (odds are 5
to 8 times higher than for middle-aged). Also, people
who visited a physician during the last 6 months but
did not pay for this are more likely to report being un-
able to pay, though this effect is not stable.
The level of positive (nonzero) WTP, akin to ability to
pay, is strongly and significantly related to both profile
characteristics and specialization of the physician. Re-
spondents report a higher WTP for a medical specialist
(around 14% more than for a GP) and for more attract-
ive quality/access profiles (around 36% higher). A strong
and stable significant positive effect on WTP is observed
for respondents with voluntary health insurance which is
associated with a 45-53% higher WTP. The WTP level is
related to the monetary income level but not to the per-
ceived one. Each 1 000 UAH (approximately 87 Euro)
increase in household income is associated with around
7% increase in the WTP level. Finally, experience in pay-
ing and visiting a physician has a significant and rather
stable effect similar to the one for inability to pay. Re-
spondents who visited a physician during the last 6
months and did not pay for this report a 20-22% lower
WTP than those who paid.
Discussion
The interpretation of the results should be done with
some caution due to the limitations of the study. The re-
sults might be affected to some extent by the small sam-
ple size. Therefore, we focus our conclusions on strong
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cification. Estimations based on bigger samples might
show more detailed variations of acceptability, ability
and willingness to pay for physician services across
population groups.
Another limitation relates to the methodology. Contin-
gent valuation is known to be subject to hypothetical
bias [20]. That is respondents might not behave in the
real world in the same way as they stated in a hypothet-
ical experiment. However, some empirical studies have
shown that open-ended CV (such as that used in our
study) produces effect sizes that are rather comparable
to real world WTP values (e.g. [21]). Nevertheless, we
are not inclined to interpret the mean WTP as an indi-
cation of the possible service fee because this requires
detailed analysis of demand behavior under different
payment regimes. Our results should be interpreted in
terms of the mere existence of the potential for patient
copayments and the main value drivers for the patients.
They may also serve as an indication of the societal
benefits obtained through consumption of services of a
given quality.
In the contingent valuation task respondents were
presented with the scenario of an official fee. Therefore,
their WTP statements might be affected by their atti-
tudes towards formal and informal payment practices.
Not all Ukrainians are positive about paying formally
[2]. Formal charges are not part of the personal commu-
nication between patient and physician. Thus, they do
not necessarily add to the coverage of personnel cost
(i.e. physician’s income) and do not assure better quality
(i.e. quality and access desired by the patient). Besides,
they may be charged on top of the informal charges
causing a double burden for the patient. Moreover,
Ukrainians are well aware of the fact that the official
salary rate in the health care sector (1 555 UAH in
December 2009 or around 135 Euro) is one of the lowest
compared to other sectors of the Ukrainian economy
[22]. Patients in many cases may perceive informal pay-
ments as an act of solidarity and a necessary supplement
to the miserable official salary of physicians [23]. Taking
these perceptions into account we might expect that on
average the true WTP level of the respondents is higher
than the ones stated in the presented contingent
valuation task due to lack of trust in official financing
channels.
Our results demonstrate that official patient charges
have potential in Ukraine. Even when faced with less at-
tractive characteristics, Ukrainians express a rather sub-
stantial level of WTP, although less than a quarter of
them are willing to pay. However, for physician services
with improved quality/access characteristics, the share of
those willing to pay is more than 70% with an average
WTP of 44.8 UAH for a visit to GP (3.9 Euro) and 51.9UAH for a medical specialist (4.5 Euro). There are no re-
liable estimates of the cost of health care services in
Ukraine due to the existence of the public funding sys-
tem where facilities are financed on a line-item budget
principle regardless of the number of services provided.
These stated WTP levels, however, are rather substantial
in comparison to the average monthly salary in the
health care sector. Taking into account that primary care
specialists are among the low-income medical workers,
the stated WTP on average appear comparable or even
higher than the official personnel costs.
The introduction of co-payments in the public health
sector may have various effects both in terms of con-
sumption patterns and the official cost of the services.
The effects on consumption should be subject of de-
mand modeling studies. From the system and provider’s
perspective, co-payments generate additional funds that
could be redistributed to achieve different goals. Our
results suggest that Ukrainians place high economic
value on quality and access improvements. Thus, patient
charges can only be implemented together with effective
investment policies targeted at improving quality and ac-
cess. The probability to object to pay for these services
is mostly explained by low quality/access characteristics.
Additionally, the likelihood of the ability to pay and the
level of positive WTP are positively and strongly related
to the quality/ access profile. Combined with the evi-
dence that Ukrainians in general are not satisfied with
the quality of care they receive [6] these findings under-
line the necessity of quality/access improvements in
health care. A rough and conservative estimation (the
difference of the mean WTP in Table 3, objection an-
swers excluded) suggests that the social benefit gained
from simple improvements in the state of medical equip-
ment, maintenance of the physician office, and reduction
of waiting time is 16.5 UAH per visit to a GP and 23.0
UAH per visit to a medical specialist (in December 2009
prices). This can be regarded as an indication of the
investment potential, although more robust estimates
based on larger samples may provide more precise indi-
cators. In Ukraine, increasing quality and access can not
only be realized through investments in training, capital,
and organizational changes, but is also tightly related to
personnel remuneration. Failure to satisfy physicians’
needs may provoke both resistance to official charges
and double charges: formal on top of informal.
Our results demonstrate that among the zero WTP
answers, protesters (the objection motive) are not driven
by economic or social barriers. The negative relation
with the share of nonworking members in the household
only supports this idea: it indicates that the more mem-
bers depend on one’s alimony, the more responsibility
one has for else’s health and life. This might increase the
value of health care service and, consequently, decrease
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to pay. Moreover, reporting objection to pay does not
necessarily lead to similar behavior in real life as it is not
related to the payment experience in the year before the
survey (i.e. chances of paying in real life are similar for
those who object to pay and for those who do not ob-
ject). Thus, both from a methodological and a policy
perspective it is rational not to account for the prefer-
ences of pure ‘protesters’.
As for the ability/inability to pay and the level of
WTP, objective socio-economic barriers, such as age and
economic status, apply. The relations with household
income also support the theoretical validity of the con-
struction of the models. It is notable however that in-
ability to pay is related to the perceived income level,
while the level of WTP is related to monetary income.
This shows that inability is a perceptional issue depend-
ing on the evaluation of one’s own income level, while
the level of the WTP is defined by real monetary budget-
ary constraints. This suggests that different mechanisms
underlie the two stages of the decision about the willing-
ness to pay for the physician services and this should be
accounted for in the WTP modeling.
The substantial share of population that is unable to
pay for physician services (at least 11.5% for the medical
specialist with attractive characteristics) is concerning.
This is in line with the extensive discussions in the
literature (e.g. [24,25]) that patient charges should be
implemented together with exemption criteria related to
age and income. To relate co-payment levels to the level
of income might also help to reduce financial barriers to
access although this is difficult to achieve in practice. A
successful example is Bulgaria where patient charges are
anchored on the minimum income in the country [26]
although this does not eliminate barriers to access.
It is also worth mentioning that we observe a slight
preference among Ukrainians for a direct referral to
medical specialist and bypassing a GP. This is expressed
through the higher likelihood of reporting inability to
pay and the lower WTP level for the latter. However,
this preference is practically non-existent for services
with less favorable characteristics although a bit more
explicated for services with more attractive quality/ac-
cess characteristics. In the latter case, people are willing
to sacrifice only around 7 – 8 UAH to bypass primary
contact. This indicates that price signals (such as higher
charges for specialists’ services without a referral) might still
be necessary to discourage bypass practices if official pa-
tient charges are introduced. However, the variation of this
preference across population groups should be studied in
more detail in order to design an effective threshold for dis-
couraging direct visits to a specialist without a referral.
To our knowledge the WTP for physician services in
Ukraine has never been studied before. Thus, testing theexternal validity using other studies may only be done in
relative terms. In our study WTP estimates range from
0.9% to 1.9% of household income when protest answers
are excluded and from 1.6% to 2.2% when only positive
values are considered. This is rather consistent for example
with the results from Spain where WTP for physician/out-
patient services represent 2% of household income [27].
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the potential and feasi-
bility of official patient charges for public health care
services in Ukraine. We addressed this issue by studying
the patterns of fee acceptability, ability and willingness
to pay (WTP) for physician services across population
groups. We found that acceptability/objection to pay is
mostly related to quality/access characteristics of the ser-
vices and is not to socio-economic characteristics.
Hence, the protesters do not seem to attach an intrinsic
‘zero value’ to the services, and should be excluded from
the estimations of WTP. At the same time, the inability
to pay and the level of WTP are related to socio-
economic factors.
Our results demonstrate that the potential of patient
charges for physician services is promising as the level of
WTP for physician services is substantial despite the qual-
ity/access profile of the services. However, if patient charges
are implemented, the lower ability and willingness to pay
among vulnerable groups should be addressed by well
designed exemption criteria based on age and income and
by anchoring co-payment levels on income.
Importantly, patient charges cannot be implemented
without quality/access improvements in Ukraine. The
social benefits that can be gained from quality improve-
ments in medical equipment, maintenance and a reduc-
tion in waiting time (expressed through an increase in
mean WTP) are rather substantial. Additionally, we find
a rather weak (around 7 UAH per visit) monetary prefer-
ence for direct referral. Thus, in the context of strength-
ening the role of primary care, differential patient
charges for different service levels may be called for.
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